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Article 5

AN ARISTOTELIAN TWIST TO FAITH AND REASON
Gregg Muilenburg

INTRODUCTION

In all other respects it is absolute.

Aristotle taught us much of what we assume about intellectual
methodology. He maintained that any well-designed investigation
must determine the nature and scope of the subject matter,
establish its end or purpose, examine the existing wisdom on the
matter and argue for that which under critical scrutiny remains
essential to the proper understanding of the phenomenon. This
brief investigation of church-related higher education will follow
a similar pattern. In the first section, I will briefly characterize the
traditional categories for understanding the relationship between
faith and reason. In the second, I will examine the epistemic
structure of values and argue that one understanding of faith sees
it as sharing that structure. In the final section, I will propose a
new view of the relation of faith to learning in the context of
church related higher education and draw some initial conclusions
concerning the nature of that education.

A closely related assumption reminds us that knowing, like
believing, is an activity in which people engage. It is not
generically human, as the Enlightenment had us believe. Nor is it
inert and sterile, as modem science had us believe. Knowing is
acting in pursuit of a goal, and as such, is to be understood in terms
of the knower's precipitating desires and beliefs. Aristotle was
right to insist on this interpretation of knowledge as action; but, he
was wrong to restrict it to merely practical knowing. All knowing
involves a pattern of action which must be practiced, perfected and
habituated through a constant commitment to it. Perhaps Plato
was right in describing learning as more like loving than like
seemg.

Since any investigation must proceed with the aid of assumptions,
and, since the disclosure of such assumptions is essential to
responsible scholarship and critical assessment, allow me to
confess the following operational assumptions: First of all, recent
developments in epistemology have shown it philosophically
undeniable that all of our knowledge is perspectival in character.
Knowing and learning take place in contexts and unavoidably
reflect those contexts. That there is no Archimedean point is now
as obvious in epistemology as it is in physics. The debt for this
change in epistemic attitude is owed to the philosophers and
historians of science who argued persistently and painfully for a
position that often alienated them from their colleagues and their
tradition. As a consequence, we are now "invited" to see faith and
learning as much more intimately related (owing to the shared
quality of perspective) than any self-respecting scholar would have
admitted during the prior two centuries (in the so-called
foundationalist era, a time when knowledge was thought to have an
indubitable base).

Over the centuries there have been many different ways of
understanding the relationship between faith and learning (faith
and reason). Ignoring for the moment subtle variations and a
history of muddled terminology, the Christian tradition presents
four main models: conflict, independence, dialogue and
integration.

That few, if any, persist in the error that is foundationalism does
not, however, entail that the new perspectivalism is immune to
error. Very often the truth of the dictum, "AH knowledge is
perspectival", is confused with its fallacious converse, "All
perspective is knowledge." A proper investigation of the
difference would require another forum, but there are at least a few
earmarks. Perspective is usually unassailable. Knowledge
is defeasible (falsifiable), and welcomes, even demands, rational
challenges. Perspective is relative. It is its essence to be such.
Knowledge, on the other hand, is relative only to its perspective.
Gregg Muilenburg is professor and chair of the department of
Philosophy at Concordia College.

APPROACHES TO FAITH AND LEARNING

Conflict, in its early expression, assumed that faith, based on
divine revelation, is a translational process defying justification
and hostile to reason. "I believe because it is absurd." (Tertullian)
In its modem expressions, conflict takes the form of assuming that
both faith and reason (e.g. religion and natural science) are
speaking of the same material world and speaking in the same
positivist language. So scientific materialism and creation science,
for example, square off assuming that both cannot be 1ight. In the
one case, natural science has been uncritically extended into
natural philosophy and, in the other, biblical faith has been
presented as natural science. Both extensions are confused
because they assume there is only one project, only one
perspective, and only one set of tools. This confusion involves
both a philosophical category mistake and a failure to undertake
the self-critical henneneutical task.
Independence is clearly an advance over conflict for it
acknowledges the integrity of both faith and reason and assumes
that each has its own inviolate realm of discourse, subject matter
and language. Faith involves divine revelation which is
independent of human reason even if not contradicting it (Barth).
Faith and reason pose no problems left alone to their proper
spheres. Today this view is expressed in a strict separation of
religious from scientific thought. One purports to deal with the
objective material world and the other with the subjective,
personal one. Science deals with facts and religion deals with
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values. However this approach is also confused. There is no
fact/value separation. All facts are theory laden and all theories
involve value judgments.
Knowledge is contextual and
perspectival. The knower cannot be completely separated from
that which is known. It is this awareness that leads to the final two
ways of relating faith and Jearning, both of which presuppose that
the relationship between faith and learning is a · close and
complementary one.
Dialogue assumes that each side has much to learn from the other.
This becomes especially clear when certain types of fundamental
questions or methodological parallels are considered. While
disciplinary integrity must be maintained, there are questions of
ultimate significance which both sides can approach from their
respective analyses. Dialogue fosters the sort of interdisciplinary
cooperation necessary for dealing with the complex issues of our
emerging global society and the sort of self-critical examination
necessary for intellectual honesty and humility. Such dialogue
preserves disciplinary integrity while also accommodating the
wider human condition in and through which it takes place.
This understanding of the relationship of faith and learning is
particularly at home in the Lutheran tradition where faith is
understood as trust in the justifying power of God's grace brought
into critical relationship with the other realms of human experience
and thought. The dialectical pursuit of truth in such a fashion is
clearly a viable expression of a doxologicalvisioil.
While dialogue may be the most realistic goal in relating faith and
learning, it is not the only one reflective of the Reformational
heritage. There is a fourth option, that of integration. In this
understanding of the intimate connection of faith to reason, the two
are seen to function in intrinsic complementarity, each disclosing
unique dimensions of reality and connecting them through a
common metaphysical vision. Integrative relationships stimulate
both faith and reason to reach out through the educative activity to
a common confession of a universe seen as an integrated whole.
Such wholeness is said to be the ultimate goal of education.
There is, however, little agreement on matters of method and
practice even among those committed to such integrated education.
As there is little to be gained, beyond endurance, by plowing
through these well-tilled church/college taxonomies, and as these
schemes appear to place the plow before the horse by restricting
education before understanding it, our time might be better spent
in speculating directly on the character of integrative education we
seek.
THE STRUCTURE OF VALUE AND FArnI
There is nothing philosophically perspicuous about saying one
values something. The term 'value' is as vacuous as it is
ubiquitous. Upon reflection, however, it is clear that values· are
beliefs, albeit beliefs of a special sort. It seems to me that values
are assessment beliefs. That is to say, they are beliefs assessing

one "thing" to be better than another, and thus have the general
form: 'x is better than y.' Of course values never display just this
form, for values are never devoid of content and rarely absolute.
Virtually anything can be the object of a value. People, events,
physical objects, situations, ideas; all are objects of assessment
beliefs. Consequently, any assessment will have to be relative to
the nature of the thing being assessed and the purpose to which
that thing is put. For example, one does not actually say that one
values cats. Rather one says that cats are to be valued over dogs,
or cats are better than parrots; or more properly, that cats are nicer
pets than dogs or parrots. So also, values will be relative to the
individual holding the belief. We may differ with regard to cats,
or disagree about what makes a good pet. But all of this is well
understood, so well understood that we rarely consider values to
have a structure at all and presume all matters of valuing
completely relative and beyond rational debate.
If the basic structure of a value (x is better than y with respect to
some purpose for some person) is somewhat pedantic, the
characteristics associated with values are anything but. Most of
the world's great tragedies are constructed around the lives of
individuals struggling with values. From Oedipus to Lady
Macbeth to Willy Loman, the drama recurs. There are simple
reasons for this to be found in the character of valuing. I will
mention only two. Values are beliefs that people hold most dear
to them. They are the beliefs we will least often give up; for they
are the source of our identity, our community and are reflective of
our sense of purpose.
Values are also protected from examination by elaborate
psychological mechanisms designed to fool others, but as often, to
fool ourselves. Yet, despite all the secrecy and subterfuge, the
nature of our values is painfully obvious through our actions.
Values are the guides for the living of our lives. They are the
objects of our pursuits. There can be no such thing as a latent or
inactive value. If something is valued, it is pursued. If it is not
pursued, it is not valued in those circumstances or valued less than
something else. Thus, our actions are inerrant records of our
values. They, like the oracles of old, are not always easily
interpreted, but they will never lie. Herein lies life's drama: What
should we value? How do we responsibly pursue it? Why do we
not pursue that which we believe we value? In short, the ultimate
question of both life and learning is: How then should we live?
It seems to me that the answer to this question is itself the
statement of a value and therein lies the connection of value to
faith. We ought, of course, to live our lives responsibly and with
integrity. All other values and the pursuits they occasion ought to
be subservient to this higher value. But why value responsibility
and integrity in one's life? There appears to be no further value to
which one can appeal in answer. There appears no value
demonstrably higher, no principle from which it can be deduced.
This is no mere philosopher's dilemma, no idle logician's puzzle.
There can be no more fundamental demand. But how can we
answer it? By faith. By our faith we might answer that a life of
responsibility and integrity is required of us as a response to God's
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self-revelatory acts of creation and redemption. We have no
higher value to justify that belief. It has no goal beyond itself, it is
the paramount value.
It may seem unconventional, even odd, to speak of faith as a value.
Faith is a relation between a believer and the object of that
believing. The oddness attending the term 'faith' so used, is, I
suspect, very much the same as that which attended the use of the
term 'value' initially. Valuing, as we have seen is also a relation
between a person and a thing. One speaks loosely when one calls
something a value. That looseness is transferred to the claim that
faith is a value. The only difference is that faith is an ultimate
value. In all but this respect, it shares the structure of lesser
values.
If what has been suggested here is correct, in other words, if faith
is to be understood as ultimate value; then two implications follow
for the investigation of faith and learning. Each is rooted in our
prior assumptions and each will be treated briefly in the
subsequent section. First of all, learning is action, and action, as
Aristotle taught us is caused by desire. Knowledge and belief
condition our actions making them feasible or useful. And the
emotions help us to find the courage to act. But only desire causes
us to act. We are motivated to act by our desire for the objects of
our values. Thus, it would seem to follow that learning cannot be
fully understood without first understanding the process of desire
that moves it. Moreover, if faith constitutes an ultimate value, our
ultimate object of desire, then faith must be intimately, perhaps
causally, related to knowledge. But these are not new contentions.
They have always been part of the claims of the church, though not
couched in Aristotelian terms.
Secondly, the perspectival character of knowledge leads one to
expect that faith will be the focal point of a believer's perspective.
There would seem to be no reason why one's faith would function
peripherally if it constitutes one's ultimate value. One need not be
apologetic about the situation. Perspectives are to be expected.
Perspectives are like interchangeable camera lenses. Each is
designed to focus our attention on some aspects of the scene by
eliminating other foci from our field of view. Telephoto lens
enable us to make clearer and more precise images of distant
things by eliminating any panoramic potential in the scene. We do
not criticize the lens for doing so. That is simply how it works. So
it is with epistemic perspectives. They are unavo�dable. They are
desirable.
AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH TO FAITH AND
LEARNING
The ultimate goal of all education should be the production of
wholeness in the lives of human beings. Wholeness involves
integrity--the integrity that accompanies a life wherein actions
reflect professed values. Consequently, the nature of education, so
constructed, is value-directed and action-directed, the nature of
education, so contrued, is value-directed and action-directed.

Good education, then will help students to understand their values,
trace those values to their implications and effectively pursue
them. Moreover, since the pursuit of goals alone, will not, no
matter how effective, produce wholeness except that the pursuit is
a responsible one, good education must be directed toeard the
responsible pursuit of values. Finally, since the activating force in
all action is desire, the core of education should be education of the
desire.
As desperate as the realms of value and action may seem, they
have as their common element the unique human faculty of desire.
Those things we call values are the patterns of desire we use as
guides for our lives. Moreover, it is only by virtue of the power of
desire that we act. We may plan our actions with the aid of
practical reason. We may evaluate them with theoretical wisdom.
We may encourage ourselves to act with emotion. But we only act
from desire. Thus our actions are as well judged by our desires as
our desires are surely evidenced by our actions. This relationship,
not unlike the oracles of old, never lies but always stands in need
of interpretation. Therein lies life's drama and education's
mission. If we ask the timeless question "How then are we to
live?", we are asking what is worth valuing and pursuing. To
know the answer to this question is to know how to desire well.
Education can help us to learn to live responsibly and with
integrity but it can only do so if we are encouraged, challenged and
guided to desire aright. If the ultimate goal of education is rightly
described as wholeness, then its core must be the education of
desire.
The nature of education, I would like to suggest, is to be seen as
perspectival faith directed action. If learning has been properly
characterized as a human action activated by desire then the core
of education is the education of desire. If one's faith is the ultimate
value or object of desire for the Christian (or for any person of
faith), then the core of Christian education is the education of
Christian desire. Such an education involves reflection on the life
of faith understood as directing one's desire toward the realization
of one's ultimate values. Such reflection will necessarily
investigate the proper relationship between these ultimate values
(including, but not restricted to, our confessional roots) and our
proximate values (including, but not restricted, to our ethical
concerns). These relationships are not obvious, but they are
imperative, if we are to retain our identity in a changing culture.
All the disciplines in a college must contribute to the education of
desire. Some will contribute to the store of empirical knowledge
necessary for effective and responsible action. Others will help us
see the implications for our faith and life of the actions we
contemplate. Others still will help us understand our natures, our
failings and help us accept our limitations graciously. But all will
be united in the common task of helping students and ourselves
understand what it is to desire aright and live well. It must be
emphasized that desire requires freedom and is individual. So also
is the action resulting from such desire. Thus the enemy of this
education is indoctrination and regimentation.
The situation is no different in the case of Christian education. If
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one's faith is the ultimate value or object ofdesire, then the core of
Christian education is the education of Christian desire. Such
education requires both understanding and commitment, both
reflection and cultivation. One must reflect on the life offaith and
virtue for the demands are by no means obvious. How we are to
live our lives is not made plain by the mere holding of admirable
values. It demands difficult investigations into the character ofthat
which we hold dear. Such reflection will necessarily investigate
the proper relationship between our ultimate values (including
those we call our confessional roots) and our proximate values
(including our present ethical concerns and personal ambitions).
All the disciplines of the college contribute to this reflective task.
Some will contribute to the store of empirical knowledge
necessruy for effective and responsible action. Others will help us
see the implications for our faith and life of the actions we
contemplate. Others will challenge us to see the world afresh and
give us the power to exceed our egocent1ic ambitions. Others still
will help us understand our natures, our failings, and help us to
accept our limitations graciously. But all will be united in the
common task of helping us to understand what it is to desire aright
and live well. That not for our own sake alone but also in praise
of the one that made us.
The education ofChristian desire requixes xeflective activity but it
also requires cultivating activity. If reflection tells us how to
desire and act, cultivation helps us to desire and act. What we are
cultivating in this aspect ofthe education is commitment. This is
much more difficult and time consuming work. Again, all the
disciplines will contiibute to this task in their own way. Little is
know about how this happens, but we have all seen it in the lives
of students and faculty who possess such commitlnent and are not
affraid to admit to their stuggle with the life offaith. This situation
may only be right, for one does not teach commitment. It has to be
exemplified, nurtuxed and ecouraged in the context of a community
of those who take it seriously. It is important work even for its
nebulousness. Reflection without commitment is otiose as surely
as commitment without relfection is obtuse.
It is imperative to see that the task of educating students to
Chxistian desire is a multifarious one. The sort of reflection
described demands competencies no one sort of individual can
possess. We need to understand the natural world thxoroughly that
better we can appreciate the magnitude of God's self-revelatory
act of creation. So also, we need to understand the human world
thoroughly that better we can appricieate the magnificence of
God's redemptive act. No less mutifarious is the task of
cultivating commitment. We will need those who challenge "easy

faiths" and shallow commitment; and those who strengthen
through doubt We will need those who nurse "damaged faith;"
and those who encourage tlrrough devotion. As there is not one
path to commitment, so there is no one guide.
By way of recapitulation and recommendation, it has been
suggested that we need no longer apologize for the pursuit of
knowledge in the context of faith. We cannot avoid the
perspectival character of learning, and the perspective of faith is
a petfectly legitimate one. It has also been suggested that we can
begin to understand the perspective of faith seeking understanding
-- the integration of faith and learning -- if we come to see faith as
the ultimate object ofdesire. Correspondingly, since learning and
living are activities, they are brought about by the interaction of
desire and belief, it seems correct to see Chxistian education as the
education of Christian desire. Finally, that this project consists of
two distinct tasks in tension -- reflection and commitlnent -- is no
accident. It mirrors the tension of trust and assent comprising
faith, the tension of desire and belief precipitating action, and the
tension of faith and learning essential to Chxistian life. When these
tensions are utilized productively, they provide the climate in
which education flourishes.
lfthe trip to this point has been tortured but safe for Lutherans; the
recommendations it produces are straight-forward, but threatening.
If wholeness is the goal of education, it does not seem to me that
the traditional Lutheran understanding of education as dialogical
is sufficient. As is obvious from the preceding, wholeness comes
through commitment to integrated desire and action. Dialogue is
involved in that process but it is no substitute for it. Thus, it is
paramount for church-related higher education to find and nourish
scholars who are devoted to the active integration of faith and
learning. As Plato taught us, the enemy of true learning is
hypocrisy. The integration model is the only one that safeguards
it.
The other enemy oflearning is narrow-minded provincialism. The
education of desire follows no privileged pattern. It is the province
of no culture and surely no denomination. In fact the education of
desire is facilitated by as many and varied a set of examples as
possible. The examples must, however, be lived exan1ples, since
desiring aright is a practiced art not a theoretical one. What this
means for church-related higher education is that we have an
obligation to make our campuses, and especially our faculties
more diverse. On the eve of the millennium, we can do no better
for ourselves and our future, than to genuinely commit ourselves
to integration and diversity.
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